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4The forces of globalization have changed the world fundamentally, and this change has accelerated 
in recent decades. As a result of these transformations, the world has become much more 
interconnected and interdependent. We work and feel increasingly like “a global village”. 
At the same time, the globalized world faces new challenges such as climate change, environmental 
degradation, poverty, pandemics and economic crises. These challenges respect no borders and 
cannot be solved by any country working alone. They require urgent and coordinated responses 
across the globe by a multiplicity of stakeholders. 
Yet, it is increasingly obvious that our current instruments of international problem-solving are 
insufficient to cope with these problems. We must ask how we can organize our political processes 
and institutions so that they can effectively and fairly deal with both local and global challenges. 
Clearly, the problems we face today are of such magnitude and complexity that they can be solved 
only by coordinated action. Therefore, we need more effective forms of collaboration between 
international organizations, governments, the private sector, the academic world and civil society. 
As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon pointed out in his speech at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos in 2009: “Our times demand a new definition of leadership – global leadership. They demand 
a new constellation of international cooperation – governments, civil society and the private sector, 
working together for a collective global good.”1
While this call for new forms of cooperation applies to all global 
actors alike, civil society organizations (CSOs) – including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), philanthropic foundations 
and the various networks they create – can play a particularly 
important role in this evolution of global leadership. CSOs have 
become an integral part of the global governance landscape 
in recent decades and have repeatedly proven their capability 
to make a difference in world politics. They have emerged as 
a potentially global force – not as powerful as international 
organizations, national governments and transnational corporations, but nonetheless as 
independent global actors capable of affecting political agendas and fostering social change. As a 
result, global governance is increasingly characterized by cooperative arrangements among CSOs, 
governmental actors and other organizations. 
Against this background, it is important and timely to explore the potential of CSOs in developing 
more effective and legitimate forms of global governance. We must explore the roles and contributions 
of CSOs in shaping global governance and identify the promises and pitfalls of their involvement. 
We must also identify measures to be taken that could foster and improve the contributions of CSOs 
and their collaboration with other actors, especially multilateral organizations. 
1 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Speech at World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on 29 January 2009,  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=419.
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5These questions are addressed in this report initiated by the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Its findings and 
recommendations evolved from consultations with international experts who met for a workshop 
at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC in April 2010. 
The report emphasizes the need for more integrated and effective forms of “shared governance” 
and shared responsibility – i.e., collaborative efforts by CSOs and governmental actors on levels 
from the local to the global. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and governmental 
organizations. The report argues that it is imperative to strengthen the formal and informal 
infrastructure for building the capacity of CSOs working in global governance contexts. Such an 
infrastructure is a prerequisite for more effective forms of collaboration and shared governance.
I support these arguments and recommendations. I am convinced that all actors must join forces 
to solve our global problems. To facilitate more effective collaboration we need to break down 
barriers between different actors and begin structuring our cooperative efforts more horizontally 
than vertically. In any successful collaboration, CSOs and governmental actors bring unique skills 
and resources to the table, though each actor also possesses weaknesses and limitations. 
What is needed is an effective “division of labor” that builds on the respective strengths of CSOs 
and governmental organizations and, at the same time, minimizes their weaknesses. Such a 
division of labor may ultimately evolve as the result of trial and error. For this reason, it is important 
to review carefully the record of collaboration between CSOs and other actors of global governance. 
In the absence of an overarching and comprehensive approach to global governance, collaborative 
efforts among state and non-state actors will increasingly provide the framework for addressing 
many of the challenges of the globalized world. The CSO community is not the deus ex machina 
that will solve all problems associated with global governance, yet it demonstrates time and again 
that things can be done differently. It thus has the potential to become a catalyst for change and 
to contribute to the evolution of more inclusive and effective forms of shared global governance.
Jan Eliasson
Chair, WaterAid/Sweden and the Anna Lindh Memorial Fund 
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden
Former President of the United Nations General Assembly
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One distinctive political development of recent decades is the rise of shared governance – the 
augmented participation of non-state actors (particularly civil society organizations) in global 
policymaking. Our increasingly interconnected and interdependent world is characterized by 
breathtakingly rapid economic globalization, greater density of modern communication networks 
and growing mobility. As we collectively tackle the challenges of climate change, poverty and social 
inequality, food and energy insecurity and economic crises, new forms of cooperation transcending 
national and sectoral borders are necessary.
The impact of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the global governance dialogue is increasing, 
and deserves greater attention. The growing number and breadth of civil society organizations is 
the direct outcome of a steady increase in resources available from governments, international 
institutions, corporations and foundations, accompanied by greater reliance by state-based actors 
on the outsourcing of public services. Newly empowered, CSOs fill roles in global governance that 
can be broadly separated into the categories of advocacy and operations but that more specifically 
include work in agenda-setting, negotiation of norms and agreements, implementation and 
monitoring, and reaction to non-compliance. As they eagerly assume a growing share of each 
of these burdens, the civil society community is increasingly expected to prove its legitimacy 
through empirical accountability measures and through demonstrable contributions to reducing 
the “democratic deficit”. The latter is the perceived hallmark of the largely northern (OECD) 
institutions of global governance.
In our analysis of the path towards more integrated and effective collaboration, we examine the 
strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and state-based organizations in global governance. We look 
particularly at the resources, access, skills and experience that each group of actors brings to the 
dialogue, and how the “labor” of advocacy and operations might be divided accordingly. We find 
that CSOs demonstrate a number of useful strengths. They are better positioned than governments 
to take the lead in identifying and marketing issues. They face lower barriers to innovation in 
practice, and they possess unmatched direct, focused experience on the ground. State-based actors 
have more fundamental strengths such as reliable resources, unchallenged access to the global 
governance dialogue, and the prerogative of sovereignty. 
Each class of actors also suffers from critical weaknesses, however. Civil society actors’ need to 
present different faces to different audiences creates tension, as does the competition within their 
community for funding and prestige. Additionally, individual CSOs have only fragile authority 
and are subject to a number of unintended incentives that make them vulnerable to coercion by 
other actors. Governments, in our analysis, have two primary weaknesses. First, they have breadth 
without depth: they must deal with a vast array of issues faced by their citizens rather than – as 
CSOs do – a single issue and a discrete population. Second, they face unintended incentives in 
mitigating issues of concern, particularly in peace and security. 
Multilateral intergovernmental organizations, which remain the gatekeepers of the global governance 
dialogue, constitute a unique class of contributors to that dialogue. They are traditionally viewed 
as forums in which states defend and support their own interests in an international context. But 
Executive Summary
11
more recent analysis looks at the ways in which multilateral organizations, treated not as forums 
but as a separate class of actors, face a separate set of incentives that dramatically impact the 
speed and effectiveness with which they construct, implement and monitor global governance. This 
report focuses primarily on the United Nations, though its recommendations are relevant to other 
international organizations as well.
Trans-national and trans-sectoral networks constitute a rising class of actors in dealing with 
highly charged issues in global governance. From ecological issues to public health to peace and 
security challenges, such networks play an increasing role in directing and implementing global 
governance. We examine several examples of such networks in search of recommendations for 
further such collaboration.
Our analysis and collaboration with experts lead to the conclusion that the infrastructure used 
to incorporate CSOs into the United Nations and other multilaterals must be strengthened and 
expanded. No new institution is needed to serve the purpose, but the avenues of exchange 
and interaction must become easier to tread for both parties. Multilateral institutions of global 
governance can accomplish this by:
 n creating dedicated spaces and technologies for the interaction of civil society organizations and 
multilaterals;
 n creating a publicly accessible clearinghouse of information on the issues under consideration 
by, and the activities of, the UN and other multilateral agencies charged with laying out global 
governance;
 n creating a publicly accessible “experience bank” that would store codified knowledge (e.g., case 
studies, how-to guides, other concrete resources) to assist with capacity building among civil 
society organizations, particularly among Southern and underdeveloped civil society communities;
 n creating reliable, robust multi-funder pools to support the aforementioned efforts towards 
Southern capacity building and expertise;
 n providing financial support for the administrative and advocacy work of global governance 
networks (see Section 2F), including funding for training workshops and information services, 
and modest subsidies for low-cost lodging, travel and office facilities.
Such infrastructure is a basic prerequisite for shared global governance that can meet the challenges 
of this century. 
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One distinct political development of recent decades is the increased participation of non-state 
actors, particularly civil society organizations (CSOs), in global policymaking. Against this 
background, this report explores the potential of organized civil society to shape global governance 
through agenda-setting, the negotiation of norms and agreements, and the implementing and 
monitoring of international policies. The ultimate goal of this analysis is to develop forward-
thinking and practical policy recommendations for CSOs to contribute to effective and legitimate 
global governance in these policy areas. 
1.A. Globalization, global governance and civil society
Economic globalization, modern communication technology and growing mobility are creating an 
increasingly interconnected and interdependent world characterized by new forms of cooperation 
that transcend national and cultural borders. At the same time, this globalized world faces an 
unprecedented set of challenges including climate change, environmental degradation, poverty and 
social inequality, health threats, food and energy insecurity, and economic crises. In the emerging 
international chorus of voices from the global North (for our purposes, the OECD) and the global South 
(for our purposes, the G77), characterized by deepening interdependence among the many categories 
of actors, more effective instruments for international problem-solving are needed. Managing this 
interdependence through multilateral cooperation has become a question of enlightened self-interest.
The term “global governance” lacks conceptual clarity. It may refer to the structures of transnational 
cooperation between state and non-state actors, or to the collective efforts, instruments, regulatory 
regimes and institutions that exist to address challenges that are beyond the capacity of individual 
states and societies to solve. While states are still the prime actors in international affairs, various new 
forms of governance beyond the nation-state have emerged that permit civil society organizations to 
enter the global governance arena. We devote most of our attention in this paper to governance with 
government, that is, collaborative forms of governance involving state and non-state actors. 
The term “civil society” also lacks conceptual clarity. In fact, as the volume of literature on the subject 
grows, the discussion becomes more complex. Even the distinction between “NGO” and “CSO” is 
rarely well-delineated. In this report, we use “CSO” throughout, except when referring specifically to 
UN language where “NGO” is the standard. 
Michael Edwards identifies three main ideations of the concept of civil society:2
 n civil society as the “Good Society” (as opposed to “uncivil society”): the contemporary discussion 
focuses in particular on a presumed close correlation between civil society and democracy;
 n civil society as the non-profit sector: the organizations that constitute a significant part of the 
infrastructure of a modern democratic society;
2 Edwards, M. (2004). Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
1. Introduction
13
 n civil society as the public sphere: the forum in which societal issues are debated and 
negotiated. 
In an analysis of civil society and global governance, assuming that all voluntary associations wish to 
promote democracy or that they agree on a common idea of the “Good Society” is unwise. Thus, these 
three concepts of civil society complement one another, each capturing an important quality of civil 
society that is pertinent to our analysis of the role of CSOs in global governance. For the purposes of 
this report we use the following broad definition, which, notably, excludes the private sector: 
“Civil society refers to the set of institutions, organizations, and behaviors situated 
between the state, the business world, and the family. Specifically, this would include 
voluntary and non-profit organizations of many different kinds, philanthropic institutions, 
social and political movements, forms of social participation and engagement, 
the public sphere and the values and cultural patterns associated with them.”3
By playing an increasingly important role in identifying and handling transnational and global issues, 
CSOs have become a mediating element between societal interests and political regulation. Thus 
positioned, they fill several different roles: 
 n agenda-setting, in which they research, lobby and organize to draw attention to particular issues 
of concern;
 n contributing to the development of norms and agreements, in which they participate in formal 
consultation and debate within the institutions of global governance;
 n implementation and monitoring, in which they foster implementation and compliance with inter-
governmental agreements by state-based actors and/or make their own contributions to policy 
implementation;
 n  reacting to non-compliance, in which, despite having no formal enforcement powers, CSOs can 
significantly raise the costs of non-compliance.4
Within the range of CSOs engaged in global governance, one can distinguish between those 
organizations primarily engaged in advocacy and those engaged primarily in operations.5 Those CSOs 
focused on advocacy seek to influence public policy, and are most commonly referred to in discussions 
of influence because of their visibility in campaigning on particular issues. Operational or service-
providing CSOs are focused on program or policy implementation. They often work closely with 
governments and international institutions in fields such as development, health and humanitarian 
aid. Nevertheless, we acknowledge large numbers of “hybrid” CSOs, networks and alliances, all of 
3 Anheier, H.K. (2000). Can culture, market and state relate? LSE Magazine, Summer 2000, 16-18 [Quote p 17].
4 de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33.
5 Ibid., 14-16.
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which make a black-and-white taxonomy of organizations less useful. For clarity we discuss most 
activities as though they fall largely within one of these two categories.
1.B. The rise and roles of civil society organizations
The recent expansion of organized civil society was stimulated by considerable economic growth, 
the expansion of an educated urban middle class – whose leadership was critical to the emergence 
of CSOs in many parts of the world – and the availability of cheap global communications systems. 
The growth has been slow but steady. Between 1992 and 2002, the number of international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) registered with the Union of International Associations grew 
from 12,173 to 17,428 (annual growth of 3.32 percent). From 2002 to 2009, this number grew to 
21,224 (annual growth of 2.86 percent).6 Accordingly, attention to the increasing prominence of these 
“networked” organizations is called for. 
During the past two decades INGOs have become better connected with one another and with 
key international organizations (e.g., the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). Much global public policymaking 
now occurs within policy networks, which can be transgovernmental (e.g., the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision), transnational (e.g., the Climate Action Network) and/or trans-sectoral (e.g., the 
World Commission on Dams). These networks are, to many observers, promising structures that bring 
together different categories of actors in the search for equitable, realistic and sustainable policies. 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which we will examine further, is most often cited as 
a successful model of such a network.
The growth of CSOs has been stimulated by a steady increase in the resources available from 
governments, international institutions, corporations and foundations for operational activities, as 
well as a growing reliance by state-based actors on the outsourcing of public services. The growth 
in resources for advocacy activities, in contrast, has largely relied upon mobilization of support and 
funds from the general public. This growth has led to the emergence of a global space of social and 
political participation in which these actors engage with one another, with state-based actors and with 
the business sector – truly a “vast, interconnected and multi-layered non-governmental space that 
comprises many hundreds of thousands of self-directing institutions and ways of life that generate 
global effects”.7
Given the diversity of their roles, CSOs are certainly contributing to a pluralization of global governance. 
They enable multiple values, perspectives and interests to be represented in the global governance 
dialogue, and they engender greater breadth and competence in capacity and functionality within 
the cast of actors who participate in that dialogue. But what are the implications of such pluralization 
for the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance? How does the participation of CSOs help 
to address what is commonly called the democratic deficit?
6 Union of International Associations. (1992, 2002, 2009). Retrieved April 2010 from www.uia.be/stats.
7 Keane, J. (2003). Global Civil Society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Quote p 20].
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Traditionally, the principal source of legitimacy of international institutions and other instruments of 
global governance has been their capacity to address conflicts, poverty, and injustices in a manner 
that produces lasting benefits for states and societies. But this capacity alone is no longer sufficient; 
it must be complemented by input legitimacy, conferred by the participation of all categories of actors 
impacted by the regulation. When critical decisions are made by technocrats and bureaucrats in 
international institutions who are unaccountable to any discrete electoral base, individual citizens 
often have little sway over decisions that directly affect them. This condition, now commonly called 
the democratic deficit, is also characterized by the predominance of representatives from OECD 
countries within the management ranks of international organizations. Actors of global civil society, 
particularly those from the global South, are thus seen by some observers as a democratizing force 
in global governance. 
Proponents of this view emphasize that civil society actors represent “positions rather than 
populations” in the global governance dialogue, and that their contribution can best be characterized 
as legitimacy by voice, rather than by vote.8 Many observers are, however, skeptical of the value of 
CSOs as a mitigating force for such a democratic deficit. These latter observers say that many CSOs 
have no legitimate democratic system of representation themselves, and do not add a democratic 
quality to global governance merely by claiming to represent the underrepresented. Skeptics also 
suggest that individual constituents of CSOs are better viewed as customers or supporters than 
as simple voters.9 Without a democratic system of internal decision-making that yields “one voice, 
one vote” choices, they say, CSOs cannot truly contribute to a more democratic global dialogue. 
Accordingly, CSOs must become more transparent and accountable if they wish to retain and expand 
their participation in global governance.10
Measured against traditional standards of representative democracy, greater participation of CSOs in 
international institutions is a drop in the bucket at best. It is no “silver bullet” for the democratization of 
global governance. The club of intergovernmental organizations is still exclusive, and CSOs‘ easiest route 
to participation in global governance debates involves the permission and support of those institutions 
that, by and large, control the debates. This being said, CSOs are increasing the breadth of perspectives 
and interests that are represented in these debates, and this contribution must be supported.
Against this background, this report examines the roles and potential of CSOs in global governance. 
It focuses on the collaboration between CSOs and multilateral organizations with a special emphasis 
on the United Nations. We conclude that there is a strong need for international institutions to support 
capacity building within CSOs, especially southern CSOs, working in global governance contexts. 
We also find a strong case for more thorough incorporation of, in particular, southern civil society 
contributions into the deliberations of multilaterals. Such efforts are prerequisites for more effective 
forms of shared global governance that include all actors – state, non-state, local, and global. 
8 Keck, M. E. (2004). Governance Regimes and the Politics of Discursive Representation. In N. Piper/A. Uhlin (Eds.), 
Transnational Activism in Asia: Problems of Power and Democracy, London: Routledge 2004, 43-60 [Quote p 45].
9 Clark, J. (ed.) (2003). Globalizing Civic Engagement. Civil Society and Transnational Action. London: Earthscan. (pp 1-28).
10 Anheier, H. K. & Hawkes, A. (2008). Accountability in a Globalising World: International Non-Governmental Organisations and 
Foundations. In M. Albrow, H. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. E. Price, M. Kaldor (Eds.), Global Civil Society 2007/8. Communicative 
Power and Democracy. London: Sage Publications, 124-143.
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2.A. The promise of collaboration
Since many pressing global challenges can be addressed at various levels, even small organizations 
can initiate significant change through strategically targeted action. But given the complex nature 
of the issues that the actors of global governance address, systemic change is more likely to result 
from collaborative efforts by many actors working on several levels. Accordingly, CSOs collaborate 
increasingly with governments and international institutions, but also with other public-sector and 
corporate actors.
Global governance of international issues has, historically, 
happened ad hoc as states, multilateral organizations and non-
state actors – in particular, CSOs – addressed pressing issues 
singly or in coalitions. How can the difficult labor of crafting and 
implementing global governance be apportioned among actors in 
the future? Work is currently apportioned among CSOs, states and 
the formal structures of global governance in one of three ways:
 n formal, event- or issue-specific negotiated collaboration in 
which general practices for distribution of labor are jointly 
debated and agreed;
 n a market mechanism in which labor is taken up organically 
by those actors best suited to doing it;
 n a planned economy mechanism in which labor is distributed in a hierarchical downward flow at 
the direction of the multilaterals, with little input from other actors.
Collaboration with international institutions is best demonstrated by the relationship between 
CSOs and the multinational and multilateral actors that develop and monitor global governance. 
This broad spectrum of organizations includes the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on peace and security issues, 
and the G-20, International Monetary Fund, World Bank Group and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) on issues of global economic governance. This report focuses 
primarily on the UN. 
Although Article 71 of the UN Charter mandated that only the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) should consult formally with NGOs, all main bodies of the UN involve CSOs (those that 
are accredited through ECOSOC) in some capacity today. Additionally, the establishment in 1996 of 
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 allowed national, regional and local CSOs to obtain formal consultative 
status. This is significant because such formal recognition had been accorded previously only to 
international NGOs. Within the UN structure, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(DESA) maintains a database of more than 13,000 CSOs. This database includes traditional CSOs, 
think tanks, associations, and almost 1,000 indigenous peoples’ organizations. Registration with 
“What is the value added by bringing civil society 
… more fully into global policy processes? … 
the enhancement of global policy processes in 
terms of increasing the capacity and competence 
of international organizations for fulfilling critically 
important information, normative, rule-creating, rule-
supervising, and operational functions. NGOs, other 
civil society organizations, subnational governance 
institutions and the private sector indeed provide 
much needed value added but also represent good 
value for the money in coping with the myriad 
problems confronting humankind in the early twenty-
first century” (Coate, 2009, p. 164).
2. Civil society organizations 
in international issues
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DESA is the first step towards obtaining consultative status with the ECOSOC, which is the formal 
method of securing input to global governance debates through regular UN processes, special 
conferences and preparatory meetings for those conferences.11
CSOs’ access to direct participation in governance discussions (e.g., “face time” or formal consultative 
status with those bodies that develop global governance) and to indirect influence (e.g., media 
pressure) is critical for determining the ease with which CSOs and multilaterals can work together to 
craft policy. To obtain formal access to the institutions of global governance, CSOs may need a physical 
presence in particular locations (e.g., New York and Geneva for the UN). CSOs with established bases 
and dedicated staff in critical cities are better known and respected by UN policymakers.
Recommendation:
Create dedicated spaces and technology for the interaction of CSOs and multilaterals. 
This would support systematic integration of CSO voices and would make ad hoc 
integration substantially easier.
The Quaker UN Office provides a noteworthy example of how a physical presence can dovetail with 
increased informal collaboration between CSOs and the United Nations. Housed in modest offices 
near to the UN in both New York and Geneva, the Quaker house provides a private, informal, non-
partisan and apolitical location for policymakers and CSO representatives to work on intractable 
issues. This set-up could serve as a template for others. 
While such a concrete footprint might be an unsustainable or impossible investment for many 
individual CSOs, a lack of resources can be overcome through collaborative membership in an 
issue-based or regionally based formal network of transnational CSOs. Such networks carry the 
collective legitimacy of their full memberships and are difficult to exclude from debates on relevant 
governance issues. Such networks also serve as aggregators and amplifiers for the voices of 
small and local CSOs with access to unique or especially rich information (e.g., intelligence on 
conflict zones or sudden humanitarian crises). The International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 
an observer of the UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee, for example, acts as the collective voice 
of its member CSOs on humanitarian and refugee policy issues. 
For a CSO, formal consultative status with ECOSOC also increases the CSO’s access to the debate on 
global governance issues. Increasingly, though, CSOs with formal consultative status are indirectly 
supported in negotiations on global governance by CSOs that do not have formal access, but that 
contribute their knowledge and opinions informally. In addition, the recognition by the UN and 
some of the most significant INGOs of the necessity of collaboration has led to joint efforts to 
establish open and flexible structures of collaboration. The “Principles of Partnership”, endorsed 
in 2007, were one such effort.12
11 United Nations Economic and Social Council (2010). Retrieved September 2010 from UN ECOSOC database, http://esango.
un.org/civilsociety/login.do.
12 Global Humanitarian Platform. (2008). Retrieved August 2010 from http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/
doc00002199.html.
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CSOs also indirectly influence sovereign states and global governing bodies through media 
channels and public campaigns. CSOs that manage to shape the dialogue and vocabulary that are 
used to discuss any issue can become highly influential. They can thereby pressure other actors to 
engage on an issue. But acting through this channel of influence leads to contentious, rather than 
cooperative, dialogue. 
2.B. Strengths and weaknesses of CSOs and states in constructing 
and implementing global governance
Global governance emerges often from complex discussions among CSOs, the private sector, 
states and multilaterals. Without establishment, acceptance, ratification and implementation by 
international state-based governing bodies, global governance does not exist. CSOs’ strengths can 
be deployed to contribute to a more legitimate and comprehensive dialogue on global governance, 
and states and state-based international organizations are beginning to cooperate with – and to 
co-opt – CSOs. This is particularly true of the global dialogue on controversial peace, security and 
humanitarian issues, but the trend extends to all areas of global governance. Accordingly, in this 
section we examine the strengths and incentives that drive the behavior of CSOs and the strengths 
and incentives of the multilaterals and international organizations with which CSOs must interact 
to create change on a global scale.
The strengths and weaknesses of all actors in these dialogues may be seen broadly in three areas:
 n Resources: funding and other concrete assets that enable an organization to engage with and 
influence policymaking forums;
 n Access: the organization’s formal and informal relationship to the institutions of power in global 
governance;
 n Skills and experience: the practical strengths and knowledge of an organization in its chosen 
field including direct, operational experience (e.g., development work or conflict resolution) 
and access to information, research capabilities and communication skills.
2.B.1. Strengths and weaknesses of CSOs
Broadly, CSOs can be categorized by a primary focus on advocacy (generally, agenda-setting and policy 
formulation) or on operations (generally, service delivery, implementation and monitoring).13 Larger 
CSOs that combine the two roles are best positioned to establish themselves in the global governance 
dialogue; the “virtuous cycle” of their combined operational experience (which confers access to 
specialized information and connections) and advocacy experience (with which they can channel 
resources to their issues of interest, gaining further experience, information and credibility) is powerful. 
13 de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33, 14-16.
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The strategic strengths of CSOs as contributors to a dialogue on global governance are many: 
 n First-mover advantage: In publicizing issues that have failed to gain traction with the public or 
with multilaterals, CSOs find it easier than governments to take the lead – to act as first-movers. 
This is in large part because CSOs lack genuine external voting constituencies and because 
rigorous third-party evaluation of CSOs is, for the most part, still rare (though this is changing). 
For the same reason, CSOs can undertake bold, potentially controversial actions and adopt 
innovative practices without fearing rapid reprisal from displeased voters or shareholders. 
Focused often on a single issue, and serving as they do a limited and ideologically unified set 
of (real or imagined) stakeholders, CSOs can build constituencies for their pet issues among 
their most critical supporters (donors and others) without any dispassionate assessment of 
those issues’ global relevance. It is also easier for CSOs to construct alliances and partnerships, 
because of homogeneity among their stakeholders. Such alliances imply the endorsement of 
the partner’s policy stances, and they are thus much more difficult for governments (who have 
diverse interests to serve) to undertake. Accordingly, issue-centered coalition building is far 
easier among CSOs than among state-based actors. 
 n Innovation in method: The skills and experience of CSOs are 
among their strongest contributions to international dialogue. 
Staffing in CSOs is often less dependent on simple seniority 
than that in state bureaucracies, and CSOs are likely to pay 
lower salaries than comparable government organizations. In 
the most recent figures available, the average salary for a 
government employee is US$74,403 while, according to one 
industry survey, the executive director of a not-for-profit can 
expect to make approximately US$55,000 a year.14, 15 For these 
reasons and others, CSO staffers are likely to be younger, less 
entrenched, and quicker to adopt new technologies and 
techniques than their governmental counterparts.
 n Moral authority with limited accountability: CSOs’ aura of moral 
authority is strong, yet their accountability is often opaque. 
This odd combination is a great strength of CSOs when acting 
as advocates or negotiators in global governance. Few CSOs 
formally report to clearly defined, external parties (e.g., voting constituents or shareholders) 
whose sole concern with a given CSO is its performance in support of their own needs. For 
many CSOs, constituents have no meaningful or direct mechanism of redress. Thus, while 
CSOs’ air of moral authority enables them to advocate a particular viewpoint, they need not 
consult their nominal constituents in selecting that viewpoint. 
14 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2010).  
Retrieved Aug 2010 from http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm.
15 Salary Snapshot for Non-Profit Organization Industry.  
Retrieved August 2010 from http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Industry=Non-Profit_Organization/Salary.
Case Study: Innovation in method
Frontline SMS and Ushahidi are two free and open-
source software products that facilitate monitoring 
of elections, crises, and other events by individuals 
(Frontline SMS) and by the overlay of aggregated 
reporting on maps and through time (Ushahidi). 
The teams developing Frontline SMS and Ushahidi 
worked with foundations and CSO partners to create, 
test and deploy such systems for the purpose of crisis 
management and election monitoring in countries as 
diverse as Kenya, Haiti and Afghanistan. Built entirely 
by volunteers and available for free, the promising 
technology is a clear example of early adoption 
of innovative political action. The technology was 
developed at extremely low cost and took place 
within civil society rather than at the state level.
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 n In-depth experience: Granular, direct, focused experience with issues and populations of concern 
is also a key asset for CSOs that wish to impact global governance. In contrast to governments, 
which must scatter their resources thinly across a great diversity of policy areas, operational 
CSOs have the single-issue focus, the flexible staff, and the direct experience of a conflict region 
that give their voices legitimacy. This same single-issue focus often means that CSOs have the 
speed and flexibility to be the first to respond to crises and to acquire information. CSOs are 
also better positioned than governments to vigorously pursue detailed (if, importantly, biased) 
first-hand input directly from their populations of concern. Such input, which comes from 
primary sources directly engaged with an issue, may be more valuable for this purpose than 
input from journalists or other middle men. 
The strategic weaknesses of CSOs also critically affect their performance in the global governance 
dialogue. 
 n Dual personae: CSOs must be able to speak to their intended audiences – donors, policymakers, 
the public and others – equally well in two contexts: (1) publicly, through the media; and (2) 
privately, through direct advocacy with states and multilaterals. It is extremely difficult for 
an individual CSO to be heard in either context above the cacophony of civil society voices 
speaking on any particular issue.
 n Internecine competition: The marketplace of issues within which each CSO must compete for 
attention is crowded. Within each issue, too, there is intense competition for a dominant civil 
society voice. For CSOs, this is truly competition for survival, as the voices and dollars that they 
recruit are their lifeblood. In particular, CSOs that rely to a great extent on private dollars for 
their funding play a zero-sum game to gain funds. But competition for members and supporters 
is also intense as CSOs that have large memberships can make a strong argument for inclusion 
based on the sheer weight of public opinion that they represent. 
 n Fragile authority: CSOs’ power is more fragile than that of governments, and – because the 
institutions of global governance are state-based – individual CSOs are more easily ignored or 
ostracized than are national governments. CSOs’ influence on global governance is the product 
of their assets such as funding and alliances and of their perceived validity, impartiality and 
expertise. Additionally, while CSOs can build relationships with donors – governmental and 
otherwise – with relative ease, they also risk appearing to serve at the pleasure and direction 
of those funders. This becomes particularly relevant in conflict areas, where  armed groups 
should be given no reason to conflate their concept of “the enemy” (e.g., the US military in 
Afghanistan) with associated CSOs from the same part of the world. In Afghanistan, CARE 
International and Oxfam International rejected substantial aid packages from USAID because 
of “strings attached” that required the humanitarian CSOs to work with counterinsurgency 
activities and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.16 Both organizations felt that the damage to 
their perceived legitimacy and reputation with their Afghan constituents would overwhelm 
16 USAID rejects NGO concerns over aid militarization. (2009, December 2). IRIN Asia.  
Retrieved April 2010 from http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=87288.
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the value of the funding they might receive. They worried that the funding would sour the 
relationship with the populations they endeavored to serve and render their on-ground staff 
legitimate military targets. This, of course, created tension with the counterinsurgency efforts 
and peacekeeping missions that, many claimed, were clearing the way for the efforts of CSOs. 
 n Susceptibility to coercion: Many CSOs seek formal participation in the dialogue on global 
governance through several avenues, of which consultative status with ECOSOC is one. This 
understandable desire can create a coercive environment – intentional or not – in which 
advocacy-focused CSOs in particular may feel that they must choose between “going along to 
get along” or formal ostracism from multilaterals. In addition, the value of alliance-building for 
CSOs may leave them open to coercion. Alliances built for the mere value of having a partner, 
rather than on an alignment of mission and perspective, may – when missions and strategies 
diverge – leave weaker CSOs open to coercion by stronger partners.
 n Unintended consequences: Many CSOs are focused on a single issue, and the persistence of 
that issue sustains the organization and the people in it. Accordingly, an issue-focused CSO 
will aggressively recruit funding and attention to its own issue, thereby drawing dollars away 
from other issues. This means that one organization’s success may come at the expense of a 
more critical need. 
2.B.2. Strengths and weaknesses of states
States bring different strengths to the global governance dialogue. 
 n Reliable resources: States boast unmatched financial resources, standing militaries, and plentiful 
civilian staff. Though these resources are limited, the advantage in these areas is quite markedly 
on the side of nations and multilaterals, rather than CSOs. In the context of security issues 
specifically, state-based actors also have the operational and logistical skill that much of civil 
society lacks.
 n Respect for sovereignty: For good or ill, the global acknowledgement of national sovereignty 
gives governments the power to exercise their will to the brink of internationally agreed norms. 
Governments retain this power even when their legitimacy is questioned by peer states. States 
can also wield formal, procedural influence in multilateral negotiations through veto power and 
other such mechanisms, which they can use to coerce both state level and sub-state level actors. 
 n Access and information: National governments possess unparalleled access to the structures of 
global governance, of which they are the primary creators. Governments, therefore, are extremely 
difficult to ostracize. The community of states – a coalition of the powerful – is unwilling to act 
in concert to exclude all but the most egregious offenders within their community, fearing that 
such action would set an unappealing precedent, and that other members of the community 
might find their own sovereignty comparably constrained later. Governments also have unique 
access to information about global governance activity, especially in re ongoing discussions 
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within the multilaterals that establish global governance. Simple information asymmetry puts 
governments at a great advantage, relative to CSOs.
Recommendation:
Create a publicly accessible clearinghouse of information on the issues under 
consideration by, and the activities of, the UN and other multilateral agencies. Such 
an institution might also serve as a “watchdog” to monitor important changes in the 
dialogue and activity on a particular issue.
The strategic weaknesses of governments as contributors to global governance are also manifold, 
but three are of particular interest.
 n Breadth without depth: Whereas CSOs can and do acquire granular, direct, focused skills 
and knowledge in a specific issue area, governments are weakened by the breadth of their 
responsibilities. Although they have unmatched power and durability, they find themselves 
ill-equipped to respond specifically, quickly, and in a focused way to each difficulty that their 
citizens face. This is due to the many competing interests they must balance and the ungainly 
nature of their large bureaucracies. 
 n Conflicts of interest: Governments are also prone to conflicts of interest, as are their CSO 
counterparts. A government may privately wish for the persistence of a conflict situation 
or humanitarian crisis to sustain donor flows from multilateral agencies. Alternatively, a 
regime may privately wish to suppress one ethnic, religious or political faction to solidify and 
sustain its own power. In any such case, a government’s contribution to the dialogue on global 
governance may have a motivation different from crisis resolution or other such “selfless” goals.
 n Lack of experience: Few governments remain in office for more than several years. Even when 
they do, their politicians and their diplomatic personnel are typically moved every three or four 
years from one post, department or issue to another. As a result, government officials are often 
ill-informed about institutional procedures and ill-equipped to grasp the nuances of issues.
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2.C. CSOs and states as actors in advocacy
The practice of advocacy is natural for CSOs and for governments. CSOs have the time, the interest, 
and the mission to undertake such work, while governments have the institutional mandate to serve 
the interests of their constituents in this capacity. 
For a CSO, the purpose of successful advocacy goes well beyond the support of a moral or 
humanitarian cause; indeed, success in the conduct of agenda-setting also impacts a CSO’s 
institutional survival. Without successfully pressing its primary issue onto the global agenda, 
sustaining the issue through the process of negotiations and monitoring the issue on an ongoing 
basis, an advocacy-focused CSO loses its purpose. To renew its relevance, such a CSO must reinvent 
itself or expand its focus. 
For governments, agenda-setting and negotiation are as natural as they are for CSOs. Indeed, 
governments are designed to represent the interests of their citizens comprehensively, which CSOs 
are not. Though governments run no risk of losing their seats at the table of global governance, 
merely passive participation by any single state sets a dangerous precedent, creating a vacuum 
that other states will be only too ready to fill. 
2.D. CSOs and states as actors in operations
CSOs are sometimes better positioned and more motivated than their government counterparts to 
undertake the work of implementation and long-term monitoring of governance. Before and after 
localized crises arise, CSOs are often better established on the ground than governments. CSOs 
have a legitimate interest and, often, the human assets and experience that a national government 
does not possess, simply because governments’ human and material resources are usually thinly 
spread. 
Skill in implementation is also the lifeblood that sustains many CSOs. As discussed in section 
2.B., governments that keep implementation in-house must, in addition to disbursing funds, 
assume all accountability for the results, quickly acquire, develop and retain staff, and pursue 
innovative methods by which to resolve crises. Moving quickly to do these things is unnatural for 
governments, which reasonably prefer to move cautiously and avoid taking irrevocable positions 
on hot-button issues. In contrast, CSOs are often more ready to take on all of these tasks, relying on 
governments for funding where available. CSOs can also nudge other types of actors – in particular, 
states, multilaterals and their contractors – towards better performance by drawing attention to 
their missteps and outdated practices. However, much of the research on CSOs in peace-building 
operations is critical, pointing to the prevalence of crowding out of local actors and to the failure 
of CSOs to create a sustained impact.17
17 Ohanyan, A. & Lewis, J.E. (2005). Politics of Peace-Building: Critical Evaluation of Interethnic Contact and Peace Education in 
Georgian-Abkhaz Peace Camp, 1998-2002. Peace & Change 30(1), 57-84.
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One of the few studies to categorize the roles filled by civil society in implementation describes 
two roles of particular interest to this paper: (1) protection of citizens (including monitoring within 
conflict zones); and (2) delivery of basic services in order to facilitate higher-level efforts to mitigate 
conflict.18 In the role of protection, CSOs often follow on the heels of state-based actors to undertake 
post-conflict monitoring. Such monitoring by CSOs can help to create long-term security for crisis-
affected populations. In monitoring, the primary interests of CSOs and governments should align, 
and cooperative labor between them should be feasible, if difficult. The work of monitoring may also 
be less experience-dependent, and may thus invite the participation of a diverse range of actors to 
impart legitimacy to the process and the results. CSOs are, of course, well positioned to participate 
in the process since they can offer existing on-the-ground personnel. This is particularly the case 
when CSOs act in partnership with those local organizations already positioned and integrated into 
the communities that require monitoring.
Monitoring work can also help CSOs contribute to long-term compliance with established 
governance, though in these cases the powers wielded by CSOs and governments are very different. 
Effective compliance is rarely secured without a strong coalition of governments acting through 
a multilateral or jointly as an ad hoc coalition. To achieve compliance, states use formal venues 
and channels, but such influence can be weakened by competing demands on states’ energies and 
attention. In contrast, CSOs wield little formal power but can instead raise costs for states or actors 
that fail to comply with established norms and agreements by undertaking public campaigns to 
shame non-compliant actors or by encouraging grass-roots techniques such as boycotts. In certain 
venues (e.g., the European Court of Justice) it is also possible for CSOs to bring suit against states 
for breach of international treaties, and in intergovernmental venues CSOs of particular nations 
can encourage their governments to act on their behalf. CSOs cannot, however, do a great deal to 
affect regimes or groups that are indifferent to such tools. 
In any fragile, flammable situation in which military forces are involved, the ability of CSOs to support 
the implementation and monitoring of governance can be significantly hindered by any connection, 
real or perceived, with entities that maintain peace with weapons. The line between monitoring 
work as undertaken by CSOs and enforcement work undertaken by armed representatives of states 
or multilaterals must be completely clear, because the ability of CSOs to conduct humanitarian work 
is highly dependent upon their perceived impartiality and independence.
2.E. Institutional incentives of multilaterals
Understanding the institutional incentives of the participants in the global governance game is 
critical to understanding its development. State-based multilateral organizations have ultimate 
sway over much formally established global governance, and so a brief examination of their own 
institutional incentives (as opposed to the incentives of their member states) is warranted.
18 Paffenholz, T. (2009). Summary of results for a comparative research project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding. CCDP Working 
Paper 4. Geneva: The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding.
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Traditionally, multilateral organizations are viewed as international forums in which states defend 
and support their own interests. More recently, analysis has begun to explore the conduct of 
multilateral institutions as entities unto themselves (in addition to, not instead of, their role as 
forums) with distinct organizational imperatives and goals.19 Multilateral organizations, like sub-
national coalitions, “may be created and supported for reasons of legitimacy and normative fit rather 
than efficient output; they may be created not for what they do but for what they are – for what they 
represent symbolically and the values they embody.”20 Viewed through this lens, some civil society 
observers‘ belief that multilateral institutions actually hinder the progress of global governance 
initiatives on a diverse range of topics is less difficult to understand. 
Intergovernmental organizations do not compete with one another for organizational survival, 
although they do compete for power and influence. They often have no concrete criteria for success 
or failure. They serve as aggregators of knowledge, experience and authority (moral and, to some 
extent, legal) over and above that of their component states. However, because the power of the UN 
and other multilateral organizations is derived in some measure from their aura of impartiality, 
the motivation to settle for “middle of the road” outcomes that tread on the fewest toes is clear. 
In addition, the intra-organizational war for ideological and professional turf may result in the 
exclusion of input from weaker divisions within an organization and in stalemated negotiations 
between powerful divisions. This can result in hard-fought but tardy solutions that are variously 
uncreative, uninspired or incoherent.
Likewise, because of their role as a repository of the aggregated knowledge and experience of 
their component states, multilaterals are also more likely to make significant decisions without 
consulting the “voiceless” tens of thousands whom their decisions affect – “expertise […] has 
allowed the UNHCR to make life and death decisions about [e.g.] refugees without consulting 
the refugees themselves, and to compromise the authority of states in various ways in setting up 
refugee camps.”21
Other institutional characteristics may impede creative, bold decision-making in multilaterals as 
well.22 Necessarily reliant on protocols and rules, multilaterals are likely to make decisions that 
fit the rulebook, rather than the situation. On the other hand, when an institutional protocol is 
regularly broken, the deviation itself can become an “unspoken rule.” Likewise, because of the 
inconceivably broad scope of issues they must face, multilaterals are likely to approach each 
challenge as though it occurs in a context similar to every other, and each individual as though 
s/he has a value system identical to that of the institutional technocrats themselves. 
State-based multilaterals must be treated as a distinct class of actors in global governance, rather 
than as mere venues in which other classes of actors interact. The institutional incentives that guide 
these multilaterals in their approach to the critical issues of the day can impede the development of 
19 Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations. International 
Organization 53(4), 699-732.
20 Ibid., [Quote p 703]
21 Ibid., [Quote p 710]
22 Ibid.
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fruitful collaboration with other, faster-moving actors. Nevertheless, the unique suite of capabilities 
and resources that multilaterals possess makes them the most important partners for CSOs who 
are truly interested in influencing global governance.
2.F. Networked collaboration
Increasingly, transnational networks of CSOs, governments and other actors are making their 
weight felt in the dialogue on global governance. These networks cannot reasonably be called 
a “new” species of global actor (the global anti-apartheid movement dates to the 1960s, and the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines took formal shape in 1996), but their rise as a common 
global response to issues of international concern is a noteworthy trend.
The constellation of non-state actors with consultative status to 
the UN is increasingly described as a “third UN” beyond the 
secretariat (the second UN) and the member states (the first 
UN).23 The presence of these actors in formal consultation, in 
global issue-focused campaigns (e.g., the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines) and in 
parallel forums has been a feature of UN deliberations since 1972.24 These actors, in their 
interactions with the UN, often appear as umbrella organizations that bring together many civil 
society actors around a particular issue. Such organizations can form in direct response to changes 
in the UN, as did the Environment Liaison Center International, a group of more than 6,000 NGOs 
that coalesced around the creation of the United Nations Environmental Program.25 
As these networks become more common, it is useful to examine their different purposes. Peter 
Willetts has suggested a taxonomy of networks that categorizes them as follows:26 
 n umbrella international non-governmental organizations, which have formal institutional structures 
and which can incorporate both national and international NGOs;
 n information networks, which are loose arrangements with or without a formal structure, and 
which are primarily focused on helping members to communicate and share reliable research 
and up-to-date information;
 n transnational advocacy networks, which are issue-centered loose coalitions of CSOs, states, and 
other actors;
23 Weiss, T. G., Carayannis, T. & Jolly, R. (2009). The “Third” United Nations. Global Governance, 15, 123-142.
24 Ibid.
25 Coate, R. A. (2009). The John W. Holmes Lecture: Growing the “Third UN” for People-centered Development – the United 
Nations, Civil Society, and Beyond. Global Governance, 15, 153-168.
26 Willetts, P. (2010). A Note on the Concept of Networks. Working paper for the conference “Towards a More Effective Division 
of Labor: The Role of Civil society organizations in Global Governance” held at the United States Institute of Peace in 
Washington on April 28, 2010.
“In this world, the measure of power is 
connectedness”  
(Slaughter, 2009, p. 94)
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 n issue caucuses, which are similar in composition and purpose to transnational advocacy networks 
but are focused on a particular institutional forum for a limited period of time rather than 
continually on one issue across all relevant forums;
 n governance networks, which exist to support civil society’s participation in policy making forums 
through assistance with accreditation processes, training in participation skills, and providing 
information on the activities of the governance forum of interest. They do not have common 
values, nor do they engage in advocacy.
These five types of networks are analytical ideal types. In practice, they often overlap. Information 
and governance networks, for example, may engage in a limited amount of advocacy, while advocacy 
networks may also promote research or address governance questions. Despite the blurring 
boundaries, these distinctions are helpful because they point out different roles and objectives 
that need to be understood to establish an effective collaboration within civil society and between 
civil society and state-based actors.
The security sector offers useful examples of successful and unsuccessful collaboration within 
multi-stakeholder networks. Multilateral agreements, supported by civil society communities and 
ratified by signatory governments, have been established in regard to classes of weapons such as 
nuclear, biological and chemical, as well as to specific armaments such as missiles and landmines.27 
In addition, management of security and humanitarian issues often demands the activation of 
trans-sectoral networks. But for the purposes of establishing governance, successful examples of 
networked collaboration are fewer and farther between. Rare is the issue in which a trans-sectoral 
network has successfully negotiated new norms, regulations or treaties that:
 n “have teeth” (that is, for which compliance can be monitored and/or enforced);
 n balance participation reasonably between CSOs and state-based actors;
 n produce concrete, observable outcomes.
In terms of actual policy setting, networks of a higher order – i.e., leaders and persons of influence 
and prestige worldwide, connected often across different sectors – are better placed to decide 
outcomes on all but the most public issues. Anne-Marie Slaughter has suggested that “in a 
networked world, the issue is no longer relative power but centrality.”28 The “rise of centrality” 
may be oversold as a true revolution; the royal houses of Europe for centuries focused on building 
their networks of allegiances through marriage and other connections of family or indebtedness. 
Powerful entities have always found their closest friends in other powerful entities. 
27 Finnemore, M. (2005). Fights about rules: the role of efficacy and power in changing multilateralism. Review of International 
Studies, 31, 187-206.
28 Slaughter, A. (2009). America’s Edge: Power in the networked century. Foreign Affairs, 88(1), 94-113. [Quote p 7]
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As discussed earlier, snapshots of the division of labor among 
civil society, states and multilaterals may belie more fluid 
connections between individual participants, who move easily 
from one sphere to the next. These personal ties between CSOs 
and their partners in global governance constitute a hidden 
network that depends on the sort of human networks and social 
capital that drive the success of a group or initiative in any 
community, and not on formal collaborative agreements across 
regions, issues, constituencies or sectors. 
Though governments themselves retain the formal power to set 
the international policy agenda, this power is shifting as state-
based actors begin to participate in the establishment of, and 
cede power to, trans-national and trans-sectoral networks. One 
successful example of such a network is the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the Global 
Business Coalition on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GBCATM). 
Together, these organizations coordinate efforts by the UN, the 
private sector, foundations, CSOs and governments to address 
these diseases. The prestige and sheer number of the signatories 
to the GFATM and GBCATM keep these diseases prominent on 
the international agenda.
The UN Global Compact is another example of multi-stakeholder, transnational collaboration. 
While it is certainly easy to point to new and valuable ideas of good corporate citizenship that have 
arisen from the collaboration of its more than 8,000 participants, the Compact itself is sometimes 
seen as being toothless, with no meaningful mechanism of punishment for deviation from norms 
and standards of conduct. Indeed, the Compact has as its only mechanism of enforcement the 
“delisting” of companies, and more than 1,800 have been delisted for non-compliance with Compact 
standards.29 But this rate of delisting was viewed as too high, and the Compact recently placed a 
year-long moratorium on the ejection of other companies, clearly demonstrating the Compact’s 
reluctance to enforce its own standards. 
Trans-national networks that include actors from the private sector can be uniquely successful at 
agenda setting and agenda maintenance. This is partially because international commerce runs 
through the private sector and also partially because multinational companies (particularly in 
extractive industries) often have uniquely detailed, intimate knowledge of developing countries 
and conflict zones. Major business actors (retailers in particular) may also have more regular and 
broad-based contact through ad campaigns and physical presence with the public in the developed 
world than any CSO, and they may be better at capturing the public’s attention than governmental 
actors for whom marketing is not a core strengths. Accordingly, the deployment of the private sector 
29 Williamson, H. (2010, June 23). CSR in emerging economies: Style still trumps substance. Message posted to http://blogs.
ft.com/beyond-brics/2010/06/23/csr-in-emerging-economies-style-still-trumps-substance/.
“Julia Taft ran the emergency program of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
after having been the CEO of InterAction, […] 
while being a member of a UN committee 
coordinating emergency operations, and after 
having headed the US State Department’s 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration”  
(Weiss, Carayannis, Jolly, 2009, p 134).
“Many key contributors to ideas as members 
of the first and second UN had significant 
prior associations with a university, a policy 
think tank, or a CSO – or joined one after 
leaving government or UN service. Many 
individuals have served as members or chairs 
of independent panels and commissions that 
examined emerging problems not yet on the 
international radar screen”  
(Weiss et al, 2009, p 127).
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in support of a particular issue or policy, in the context of a coalition with civil society and state-
based actors, can be a successful tactic. 
In terms of actual impact, though, private-sector partnership has 
yet to demonstrate much concrete success. The Product(RED) 
campaign, an innovative campaign designed to deploy the power 
of simple consumerism to support the GFATM, has been 
lambasted for its ineffectiveness,30 having raised a mere US$18 
million to support the GFATM after corporate partners spent 
approximately US$100 million in marketing dollars on (RED) 
campaigns. In comparison, the US government in 2006 donated 
US$724 million to the GFATM (40 times the sum raised by the 
private-sector initiative) and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation contributed US$650 million. 
Additionally, the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) shows that 
networks of established actors in global governance – CSOs and governments – can move issues 
forward that private-sector players cannot. This is because these networks are more familiar with 
the process of agenda-setting and negotiation at the global level.
Private citizens are also finding a place as stakeholders in, and contributors to, networks in global 
governance. In combination with new and inexpensive technologies such as Ushahidi and Frontline 
SMS (see section 2.B.), private citizens’ contributions of time and knowledge can help to create a 
resilient, low-cost, easy and broad-based monitoring network. Such “crowdsourcing” technologies 
also dovetail with CSOs’ increasing recognition that detailed, corporate-style market research can 
benefit their own work. CSOs are increasingly taking such lessons from the private sector and are 
employing citizen experts to obtain first-hand ideas and information from the developing world or 
from areas of conflict. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, for instance, “unofficially 
monitors and verifies the 1997 Ottawa Treaty through ‘citizen verification’ with 115 researchers 
in 85 countries.”31
2.F.1. Case Study: The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines – initially a coalition of six north Atlantic CSOs: 
Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Handicap International, Physicians for Human 
Rights, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and the Mines Advisory Group – is often held 
up as a successful model of trans-sectoral collaboration. “Since its founding, the campaign has 
grown and spread to become a network of more than 1,400 groups, including groups working 
on women, children, veterans, religious groups, the environment, human rights, arms control, 
peace and development.”32 In this and other networked campaigns, coalitions of CSOs gained 
30 Frazier, M. (2007, March 5). Costly Red Campaign Reaps Meager $18 Million. Advertising Age. Retrieved in May 2010 from 
http://adage.com/article?article_id=115287.
31 de Jonge Oudraat, C., & Haufler, V. (2008). Global Governance and the Role of NGOs in International Peace and Security. 
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Policy Report 33. [Quote p 24].
32 Williams, J. (1997). Nobel Lecture.  
Retrieved 16 September 2010 from http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-lecture.html.
„The Red campaign can be a good start or it can 
be a colossal waste of money, and it all depends 
on whether this edgy, innovative campaign inspires 
young people to be better citizens or just gives 
them an excuse to feel good about themselves 
while they buy an overpriced item they don‘t really 
need.“ - Trent Stamp, President, Charity Navigator 
(“Costly Red Campaign,” 2007)
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influence over state actors in agenda-setting and negotiations by aggregating and coordinating the 
voices of countless individuals. 
In one sense, the true genius of the ICBL network is in its organizational structure, which forms a 
tidy counterpoint to the hierarchical construction of multilateral organizations. There is no “home 
office” for the ICBL, nor is there hierarchical direction of national initiatives. The conduct and 
planning of each participating organization’s work can, within a broad set of general goals, be 
tailored to its distinct national or ideological context. This characteristic of the organization defuses 
intra-alliance tensions and makes it easy for member organizations to support the overarching goal 
of the Campaign without fearing that membership will limit their independence.
While the ICBL is justly lauded for its successful husbandry of the Ottawa Treaty through an 
extremely challenging process, the Treaty cannot be said to be an absolute success. Of the world’s 
6.7 billion people (2008), at least 3.1 billion live in countries that are NOT signatory to the landmine 
ban. These include such critical nations as India, China, Russia, Pakistan and the United States. 
2.F.2. Case Study: The World Commission on Dams
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) is an excellent example of a trans-sectoral network at work 
on several of the most pressing global challenges including water usage, energy sustainability and 
infrastructure. Most importantly, the WCD is a rare example of successful start-to-finish trans-
sectoral collaboration focused on balanced representation. It provides a model for other issue 
coalitions seeking legitimacy in their dealings with issues of global governance.33
The WCD, founded in 1997, was the outgrowth of a years-old dialogue on the performance and 
desirability of large dams. After reaching a stalemate on guidelines for dam construction under 
the auspices of the World Bank, dam-building companies, CSOs, governmental organizations and 
multilaterals agreed to create an independent commission expressly for this purpose. A true trans-
sectoral network, the Commission was an early example of balanced input across sectors. It moved 
away from the de facto reliance on traditional expertise that characterizes institutions of global 
governance and towards a more broad, diverse and inclusive model of global deliberation. 
The WCD was structured with a group of twelve commissioners, a consultative group of sixty-eight 
stakeholders and professional staff to support the commissioners. The twelve commissioners were 
intended to represent “every significant perspective in the dams debate”.34 The Commission was 
perceived as legitimate by each sector of its stakeholder constituency because, rather than relying 
on the “eminence and detachment” of its commissioners to serve as a proxy for legitimacy, it 
pursued legitimacy through an appropriate balance of representation.35 The process of identifying 
33 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. Global 
Governance, 15, 219-238.
34 Asmal, K. (2001). World Commission on Dams Report, Dams and Development. American University International Law 
Review, 16, 1411-1413 [Quote p 1412].
35 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. Global 
Governance, 15, 219-238 [Quote p 224].
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the commissioners and stakeholders became a case study in which balance across many axes – 
geography, political disposition, local/national/multinational and sector – could be identified. The 
value of achieving balance of this kind is clear, but the public and transparent quality of the debate 
surrounding the Commission’s development was new and surprising to observers.
Once the heavy debate surrounding the composition of the Commission and consultative group 
was completed, the process of the WCD’s debates was itself a case study in legitimizing processes. 
The WCD’s innovative steps towards transparency and legitimacy included the rapid publication of 
deliberative and administrative documents, even those of a kind not usually released to the public 
in previous comparable deliberations. The Commission also organized public hearings around the 
globe, though they were hampered by the Commission’s limited budget for translation. 
Interestingly, after the WCD had concluded its work, industries and governments claimed that 
“NGOs had influenced the process through insider connections and unfair access rather than 
through force of argument.”36 While the NGOs mentioned might have added to the democratic 
appearance of the Commission’s composition, the legitimacy of the Commission at the process 
level was questioned because of the behavior of CSOs rather than the more frequently accused 
demons of the private or governmental sectors. 
36 Dubash, N. (2009). Global Norms Through Global Deliberation? Reflections on the World Commission on Dams. Global 
Governance, 15, 219-238 [Quote p 226].
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3.A. Legitimacy and accountability in global governance
Legitimacy – a CSO’s image as an honest and accurately representative voice – is perhaps the 
most important asset that a CSO can have in negotiations on governance. Such legitimacy is 
increasingly conferred by “accountability” and by a long record of expertise. “Accountability” in 
civil society is often used as a synonym for financial transparency. VENRO (the German association 
of development CSOs) recently adopted binding rules for its membership, specifying accounting 
practices and reporting standards and helping the German public to assess and compare CSOs’ 
use of donor dollars. Beyond such accounting standards, concern over the largely unregulated CSO 
community has been the driver of new performance-monitoring and reporting initiatives including 
self-monitoring, complaint-based monitoring, and third-party auditing.37
Self-monitoring in the CSO community cannot be considered a sustainable framework for 
accountability. It is represented by such initiatives as the CSO Accountability Charter, founded by 
Amnesty International and several other prominent NGOs. The Charter has only a narrow reach 
(the original 2006 roster of fifteen has never increased significantly) and supports self-monitoring 
principles that inspire little confidence, for example:
“We will adhere to generally-accepted standards of technical accuracy and honesty in 
presenting and interpreting data and research, using and referencing independent 
research.”38
The One World Trust has also established an extensive clearinghouse of information on self-
regulation initiatives by CSOs worldwide, contributing to the organizations’ ability to collect, 
analyze and publicize data on their own performance. 
Complaints-based compliance and peer review are steps towards greater accountability. In a 
complaints-based model, as yet largely untested, external parties (from private citizens to peer 
organizations) are trusted to identify occasions for complaint and to submit those complaints to 
the public, an internal monitoring body (e.g., a board of directors) or an external monitoring body. 
The One World Trust has also identified several such systems, but a diligent review of the systems 
cited did not, as of early 2010, yield a Web-based submission form, a dedicated e-mail address, 
or a telephone number to call. From this, it might reasonably be construed that complaints-based 
compliance is not yet a workable reality. Peer-review systems, such as that implemented by the 
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, collect reportage on CSO performance but often 
keep their data away from public eyes, using it instead within the civil society community as a 
“lessons-learned” process. Thus it might be better described as a teaching tool than a step towards 
actual public accountability. 
37 Lingán, J., Cavender, A., Lloyd, R., & Gwynne, B. (2009). Responding to NGO Development Effectiveness Initiatives. One World 
Trust / World Vision Briefing Paper No. 122.
38 International Non-Governmental Organisations Commitment to Accountability. INGO Accountability Charter. Retrieved 
August 2010 from http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/read-the-charter/principles/.
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Finally, third-party audits include the work of such parties as the French SGS Group, Social 
Accountability International, and People in Aid. Though not specifically intended to audit the work 
and ethics of civil society actors in global governance, these organizations nevertheless perform a 
unique service. They audit “one level up”, examining management practices within CSOs. Social 
Accountability International, for example, provides accreditation to CSOs based on its proprietary 
SA8000 standards, which are themselves built on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the international ISO 9000 auditing for code-based 
standards of practice.39 
Third-party auditing – doubtless a positive step towards creating a culture of accountability – 
covers only a tiny percentage of the more than 3,000 CSOs with consultative status at the UN 
through ECOSOC, not to mention the more than 20,000 international CSOs listed in the Yearbook 
of International Organizations for 2005/2006. Until the stakeholders of CSOs themselves begin 
to demand accountability and to “vote with their feet”, shifting their “business” in the form of 
access, endorsements and dollars preferentially to those CSOs with internationally recognized 
certifications, even third-party auditing will remain a fundamentally voluntary system of self-
monitoring.
3.B. The “democratic deficit”: imbalances in North-South  
representation
Many observers have commented on a perceived North-South divide (for our purposes, we will 
define this broadly as OECD-G77) in CSO representation at the UN and other bodies of global 
governance.40, 41 These observers suggest that, as a result of this divide, norms and standards flow 
from northern cultures to southern, and that those organizations developing global governance are 
in many ways disconnected from the populations that will be directly affected by that governance. 
Though this is not uniformly the case, the high visibility of developed or northern states in the 
creation of global governance, particularly in such venues such as the G-8, G20 or P5+1, relative 
to developing or southern states understandably inspires this concern.
This divide between North and South is apparent at the UN. More than 25 percent of the 3,345 
ECOSOC-registered NGOs with a specific headquarters address are based in North America. 
Another 20 percent are based in Western Europe;42 eight percent are in northern Europe.43, 44 More 
dramatically, two-thirds of such NGOs are headquartered in OECD countries, translating to a per-
39 Retrieved August 2010 from http://www.sa-intl.org/.
40 Bendaña, A. (2006). NGOs and Social Movements: A North/South Divide? United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development: Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 22. 
41 Weiss, T. G. (2009). Moving Beyond North-South Theatre. Third World Quarterly, 30 (2), 271 – 284.
42 According to the UN Geoscheme, this includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands and Switzerland.
43 According to the UN Geoscheme, this includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
44 For further detail, constituent countries of each region, and explanation of calculations, see tables, pp: 39-52
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capita representation45 of 1.86 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents of the OECD. This contrasts with only 
0.18 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents in the G77 community. If regional representation by GDP46 is 
calculated, the OECD remains the best represented, with 0.058 NGOs at the UN per US$billion of 
GDP compared to 0.037 NGOs for the same amount of GDP in the G77. The tables at the end of this 
report offer further analysis.
It is possible, however, that the perceived North-South divide is a proxy for other slow-changing 
characteristics that are typical to southern or to northern countries. Countries with large, dense, 
wealthy populations might reasonably be expected to nurture CSOs. In contrast, those countries 
with small populations, low population density, a high preponderance of subsistence living, low 
access to discretionary funding for the typical activities of civil society and low access to the tools 
that enable collective and international action in the modern world are less likely to nurture CSOs 
of the sort recognized by the UN. 
How can this condition be remedied? The procedural formalities of global governance institutions – 
a quality critical to their legitimacy and ability to act on the world stage – creates a predisposition 
towards typically Northern actors with extensive formal education and familiarity with the 
bureaucracy of the UN and other multilaterals. Also, cultural factors such as a history of organization 
and collective action around social issues – perhaps in the form of labor unions – might reasonably 
be considered to help determine the relative rate of formation of CSOs. The preponderance of such 
collective action is with the global North. 
This also calls to mind the disparity in resourcing between northern and southern CSOs. CSOs 
based in comparatively poor nations often face scarcity of the funding that is necessary to build 
or acquire basic office infrastructure, to travel, to engage media, or to recruit a workforce. This is 
perhaps the most serious barrier to the creation of organizations capable of interacting fruitfully 
on the global stage.
Recommendation:
Create robust multi-funder pools to support the development of southern CSOs’ 
capacity and infrastructure.
A truly trans-sectoral and geographically comprehensive model of global governance must 
incorporate civil society of the global South to a greater extent, as so many humanitarian, 
environmental, peace and security issues directly impact the global South. Though apparent 
concentration of CSOs in the global South is low, relative to the global North, one observer has noted 
that “registration [of CSOs] in many southern countries is weak or non-existent…They proliferate, 
even if they are not formed in the [model] we might talk about in the North.”47 How might the 
participation of southern civil society be encouraged and facilitated? 
45 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (millions of people in Region X)
46 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (US$ billion of GDP (PPP) for Region X)
47 Steve Darvill, in an e-mail to the authors dated 29 June, 2010.
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To obtain the participation of southern CSOs, such CSOs must first exist in sufficient numbers and 
have the appropriate skills to encourage multilaterals to include them in discussions on global 
governance. These goals require the concrete support of experienced northern colleagues and 
multilaterals themselves. Beyond funding that lowers the physical barriers to access, southern 
CSOs also need support in the form of education and training that helps them to learn the nuances 
of working with complex multilaterals. 
Recommendation:
Create a publicly accessible “experience bank” of case studies, “how-to” guides, and 
other concrete resources to help under-resourced southern CSOs build capacity and 
access knowledge without direct training and experience.
Multilaterals and northern CSOs must actively seek the knowledge, ability and experience of the 
less-formalized community of southern CSOs. The following recommendations for doing this will 
help to create the foundation for richer, more comprehensive debate on global issues of the future.
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4.A. Conclusions: the way forward
Our world is changing rapidly, and the challenges that we face are increasingly global, rather than 
local. Yet existing institutions of global governance still have no truly global dialogue on the most 
pressing issues of the day. CSOs, particularly those from the less-developed world, can help address 
this problem. To bring the voices of these organizations into the discussion, however, requires 
action on the part of multilaterals and civil society from developed nations. 
In this paper we have discussed the rise of civil society as a contributor to discussions on global 
governance, and examined the strengths and weaknesses that CSOs, governments, businesses 
and multilateral organizations evince as actors in creating and implementing global governance. 
We have also sought to examine the perceived “democratic deficit”, i.e., the disparity between the 
influence of civil society from northern (OECD) and southern (G77) countries in the creation of 
global governance. 
The process of developing global governance will continue to be characterized by conflicts of interest, 
disparities among contributors’ expertise, education and vocabulary, and frequent exchange of 
personnel among actors. This can blur boundaries between organizations, but it can also create “social 
capital” within the community of contributors, and ease discussions of polarizing issues. 48
Many examples of effective or ineffective collaboration exist, and they provide “how-to” templates 
for a future division of labor among actors. It may seem that more clearly defined roles for 
different classes of actors are warranted to respond more quickly and effectively to crises. But 
such specialization would come at the expense of flexibility and might reduce the capacity of 
multilaterals and CSOs to respond to global issues and crises in an ad hoc, “best-fit” manner.
More frequent informal consultation, as in the relationship between CSOs and the UN Security 
Council, is an alternative. CSOs’ informal involvement with the UN Security Council has increased 
substantially in the past two decades, although CSOs are not officially authorized to consult with 
the Council.49 Initial reaction from the P-5 to formal CSO consultation with the Security Council was 
negative, but the prospect of an informal process of interaction through the NGO Working Group 
was received more warmly. CSOs now regularly report and advocate through informal channels of 
communication, including private meetings between CSO representatives and mission delegates.50 
If future challenges are to be met by diverse, powerful coalitions of actors from multiple sectors 
and many regions of the globe, models of effective collaboration must be catalogued, described, 
and expanded. Those actors with the greatest power to alter the nature of the global governance 
dialogue must undertake new and innovative steps such as those discussed below. With such 
efforts, a truly shared model of global governance is possible.
48 Weiss, T. G., Carayannis, T. & Jolly, R. (2009). The “Third” United Nations. Global Governance, 15, 123-142.
49 Paul, J. (2004). NGOs and the UN Security Council. Global Policy Forum. Retrieved August 2010 from http://www.
globalpolicy.org/publications-mm/all-policy-papers-articles-and-statements-mm.html#2004.
50 Ibid.
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4.B. Recommendations to multilateral organizations
The participation of organized civil society in the development and implementation of global 
governance already occurs at a high level. This has come about as the demand for the knowledge 
and first-hand experience possessed by CSOs has increased, and as CSOs have learned better 
how to assert themselves on the governance stage. How, then, can this increasing participation be 
tailored to maximize its benefit for all concerned parties?
The infrastructure used to incorporate CSOs into the UN and other multilaterals must be 
strengthened and expanded. This is not to say that a new institution is needed to serve the purpose, 
but that the avenues of exchange and interaction must become easier to tread for both parties. 
This can be accomplished through a number of concrete steps, some of which are proposed below. 
These measures must also be used to support southern CSOs and to promote civil society in less-
developed countries.
1. Create dedicated spaces and technology for the interaction of CSOs and multilaterals. Such efforts 
would primarily contribute to better access for smaller southern and northern CSOs that cannot 
sustain the human and physical infrastructure to maintain regular contact with multilaterals in 
New York, Geneva, Washington, DC or elsewhere. The existence of dedicated, accessible, reliable 
and widely affordable spaces and video/audio links would support systematic integration of 
civil society voices into the global governance dialogue and would also make ad hoc integration 
easier, permitting multilaterals, states and CSOs to respond in a rapid and coordinated way to 
urgent issues.
2. Create a central, well-designed and broadly accessible clearinghouse of information on current, 
past and future deliberations and activities of the UN and other multilateral agencies. Such a 
clearinghouse would enable CSOs of all kinds to have equal and more timely access to knowledge 
of the UN’s activities. This would create a level playing field and empower CSOs to participate 
in discussions that are relevant to them and to their constituents. Such a clearinghouse might 
also serve as a watchdog to monitor important changes in the dialogue (e.g., substantial shifts 
in direction or tone) and activity on a particular issue.
3. Create a publicly accessible experience bank that would store codified knowledge (e.g., case 
studies, “how-to” guides, other concrete resources) to assist with capacity building among all 
CSOs, but with a particular focus on southern and underdeveloped civil society communities. 
Multilaterals value technological expertise and traditional education and prefer to receive input 
in a customary format and style; such an experience bank would contribute substantially to 
the ability of southern CSOs to create space for themselves in the global governance dialogue 
through: (1) the development of the requisite expertise and education; and (2) practice in the 
format and style preferred by multilaterals.
4. Create reliable, robust multi-funder pools to support the aforementioned efforts towards southern 
capacity building and expertise. These multi-funder pools might take the form of issue-focused 
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networks, and would work to support capacity building among southern organizations and the 
increased demand for southern knowledge and expertise among multilateral organizations. 
This in itself would serve as an incentive for growth in southern civil society.
5. Recognize and fund the work of global governance networks (see Section 2.F.), which can and do 
serve a critical role in facilitating the participation of southern CSOs in the development of global 
governance. Such support might include funding (to be channeled through the governance 
networks) for training workshops and information services, as well as modest subsidies for 
low-cost lodging, travel and office facilities. This would lower the barriers to participation for 
southern CSOs. It would also require multilaterals to give increased importance to funding the 
administrative work conducted by CSOs, as well as their better resourced operational work.
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The following tables are intended to illustrate the North / South divide in civil society representation 
at the UN. Of the complete list of 3,413 NGOs that were registered with ECOSOC at the UN at the 
time of research, 3,345 (98 percent) are analyzed below. These are the organizations that, as 
of September 2010, had registered headquarters in a specific country.51 No distinction is drawn 
between NGOs that operate locally or globally; the only metric used is the nation in which each 
NGO’s headquarters is registered. This metric is crude, but the authors hope that the data will help 
to make the perceived disparity in North / South representation more concrete. 
For regional analysis, the countries are categorized according to: 
 n their regions as defined by the UN Geoscheme;
 n their status as OECD or G77 members (or neither); and 
 n their continents as defined by the UN Geoscheme.
The three metrics by which the various groups are sorted are:
 n the percentage of the 3,413 NGOs that is housed in that group;
 n the number of ECOSOC-registered NGOs per 1,000,000 citizens of that group; and
 n the number of ECOSOC-registered NGOs per US$1 billion by purchasing-power parity (PPP) in 
GDP.
GDP figures (PPP) were obtained mostly from the IMF, as were GDP-per-capita (PPP) figures. 
Population figures are primarily UN estimates for 2010. Where these sources were incomplete, 
other sources (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency’s figures or national statistical services) were 
consulted. A comprehensive list of sources for each data point is available from the authors upon 
request.
There are many figures that illustrate the North / South divide. More than 25 percent of the 3,345 
ECOSOC-registered NGOs with a specific headquarters address are based in North America, though 
North America is home to only about five percent of the world’s population. Another 20 percent 
are based in Western Europe; where less than three percent of the world’s people live, and eight 
percent of the NGOs analyzed are headquartered in northern Europe, with less than two percent 
of the world’s people (see Table 1).
51 NGOs were excluded from analysis if no headquarters location could be identified. Three NGOs headquartered in the Holy See 




More dramatically, two-thirds of the NGOs analyzed are headquartered in OECD countries, 
translating to a per-capita representation52 of 1.86 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents of the OECD. 
This contrasts with only 0.18 NGOs per 1,000,000 residents in the G77 community. Put another 
way, each NGO headquartered in the G77 represents ten times as many people as an NGO 
headquartered in the OECD. If regional representation by GDP53 is calculated, the OECD remains 
the best represented, with 0.058 NGOs at the UN per US$billion of GDP compared to 0.037 NGOs 
for the same amount of GDP in the G77 (see Table 3). 
The most direly underrepresented regions by population are in Asia. If Melanesia and Micronesia 
are considered to be outliers because of their comparatively tiny populations, the four most poorly 
represented regions by population are South Asia (with 0.14 NGOs at the UN for every million 
inhabitants), South-East Asia, Central Asia and, finally, East Asia (including China), for which 
every million citizens are represented by 0.08 NGOs at the UN. For comparison, Western Europe 
has 3.65 NGOs at the UN for every million citizens, North America has 2.57, and South America 
has 0.29 (See Table 2).
52 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (millions of people in Region X)
53 (Number of registered NGOs headquartered in Region X) / (US$ billion of GDP (PPP) for Region X)
41
REGION (UN Geoscheme) NGOs NGOs (UN %) Population (global %) GDP (global %)
Australia / New Zealand  42 1,23% 0,39% 1,40%
Caribbean  36 1,05% 0,54% 0,39%
Central America  38 1,11% 2,21% 2,48%
Central Asia  7 0,21% 0,91% 0,44%
East Asia  129 3,78% 22,75% 21,16%
Eastern Africa  52 1,52% 4,70% 0,48%
Eastern Europe  85 2,49% 4,31% 6,08%
Melanesia  1 0,03% 0,13% 0,03%
Micronesia  -   0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Middle Africa  55 1,61% 1,89% 0,36%
North Africa  133 3,90% 2,97% 1,55%
North America  884 25,90% 5,05% 22,45%
Northern Europe  303 8,88% 1,45% 5,00%
Polynesia  1 0,03% 0,00% 0,00%
South America  112 3,28% 5,73% 5,87%
South Asia  228 6,68% 24,61% 7,47%
South-East Asia  67 1,96% 8,55% 4,08%
Southern Africa  15 0,44% 0,84% 0,78%
Southern Europe  198 5,80% 2,27% 5,77%
West Africa  155 4,54% 4,50% 0,71%
Western Asia  106 3,11% 3,37% 3,88%
Western Europe  698 20,45% 2,81% 9,61%
CONTINENT (UN Geoscheme) NGOs NGOs (UN %) Population (global %) GDP (global %)
Africa  410 12,01% 14,90% 3,89%
Americas  1.070 31,35% 13,53% 31,19%
Asia  537 15,73% 60,19% 37,04%
Europe  1.284 37,62% 10,85% 26,46%
Oceania  44 1,29% 0,53% 1,43%
G77 / OECD / - NGOs NGOs (UN %) Population (global %) GDP (global %)
OECD  2.295 67,24% 18,08% 57,52%
G77  947 27,75% 76,95% 36,67%
Neither OECD nor G77  103 3,02% 4,97% 5,81%
Table 1. 
Percentages of UN NGO representation, world population, and world GDP
42
Table 2. (I) 
Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)

















GDP per  
capita  
(calculated)
1 North America  884 25,90%  2,57  0,057 5,05% 22,45%  344.363.000  $15.537.339  $45.119,07 
2 Western Europe  698 20,45%  3,65  0,105 2,81% 9,61%  191.415.091  $6.653.835  $34.761,29 
3 Northern Europe  303 8,88%  3,06  0,087 1,45% 5,00%  98.876.895  $3.463.086  $35.024,22 
4 South Asia  228 6,68%  0,14  0,044 24,61% 7,47%  1.677.377.000  $5.168.519  $3.081,31 
5 Southern Europe  198 5,80%  1,28  0,050 2,27% 5,77%  154.881.618  $3.991.015  $25.768,16 
6 West Africa  155 4,54%  0,51  0,314 4,50% 0,71%  306.624.784  $493.947  $1.610,92 
7 North Africa  133 3,90%  0,66  0,124 2,97% 1,55%  202.396.990  $1.072.828  $5.300,61 
8 East Asia  129 3,78%  0,08  0,009 22,75% 21,16%  1.550.171.845  $14.645.284  $9.447,52 
9 South America  112 3,28%  0,29  0,028 5,73% 5,87%  390.255.488  $4.060.056  $10.403,58 
10 Western Asia  106 3,11%  0,46  0,039 3,37% 3,88%  229.939.775  $2.688.548  $11.692,40 
11 Eastern Europe  85 2,49%  0,29  0,020 4,31% 6,08%  293.997.659  $4.206.194  $14.306,90 
12 South-East Asia  67 1,96%  0,11  0,024 8,55% 4,08%  582.798.317  $2.824.623  $4.846,66 
13 Middle Africa  55 1,61%  0,43  0,224 1,89% 0,36%  128.676.106  $246.072  $1.912,34 
14 Eastern Africa  52 1,52%  0,16  0,155 4,70% 0,48%  320.396.000  $334.965  $1.045,47 
15 Australia / New Zealand  42 1,23%  1,57  0,043 0,39% 1,40%  26.830.605  $966.879  $36.036,42 
16 Central America  38 1,11%  0,25  0,022 2,21% 2,48%  150.689.887  $1.715.653  $11.385,32 
17 Caribbean  36 1,05%  0,98  0,134 0,54% 0,39%  36.889.000  $268.328  $7.273,93 
18 Southern Africa  15 0,44%  0,26  0,028 0,84% 0,78%  57.467.300  $541.607  $9.424,61 
19 Central Asia  7 0,21%  0,11  0,023 0,91% 0,44%  61.793.000  $303.758  $4.915,73 
20 Melanesia  1 0,03%  0,12  0,053 0,13% 0,03%  8.524.000  $18.776  $2.202,72 
21 Polynesia  1 0,03%  3,41  0,600 0,00% 0,00%  293.000  $1.667  $5.689,42 
22 Micronesia  -   0,00%  -    -   0,00% 0,00%  231.000  $1.010  $4.372,29 
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Table 2. (II) 
Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)

















GDP per  
capita  
(calculated)
1 Western Europe  698 20,45%  3,65  0,105 2,81% 9,61%  191.415.091  $6.653.835  $34.761,29 
2 Polynesia  1 0,03%  3,41  0,600 0,00% 0,00%  293.000  $1.667  $5.689,42 
3 Northern Europe  303 8,88%  3,06  0,087 1,45% 5,00%  98.876.895  $3.463.086  $35.024,22 
4 North America  884 25,90%  2,57  0,057 5,05% 22,45%  344.363.000  $15.537.339  $45.119,07 
5 Australia / New Zealand  42 1,23%  1,57  0,043 0,39% 1,40%  26.830.605  $966.879  $36.036,42 
6 Southern Europe  198 5,80%  1,28  0,050 2,27% 5,77%  154.881.618  $3.991.015  $25.768,16 
7 Caribbean  36 1,05%  0,98  0,134 0,54% 0,39%  36.889.000  $268.328  $7.273,93 
8 North Africa  133 3,90%  0,66  0,124 2,97% 1,55%  202.396.990  $1.072.828  $5.300,61 
9 West Africa  155 4,54%  0,51  0,314 4,50% 0,71%  306.624.784  $493.947  $1.610,92 
10 Western Asia  106 3,11%  0,46  0,039 3,37% 3,88%  229.939.775  $2.688.548  $11.692,40 
11 Middle Africa  55 1,61%  0,43  0,224 1,89% 0,36%  128.676.106  $246.072  $1.912,34 
12 Eastern Europe  85 2,49%  0,29  0,020 4,31% 6,08%  293.997.659  $4.206.194  $14.306,90 
13 South America  112 3,28%  0,29  0,028 5,73% 5,87%  390.255.488  $4.060.056  $10.403,58 
14 Southern Africa  15 0,44%  0,26  0,028 0,84% 0,78%  57.467.300  $541.607  $9.424,61 
15 Central America  38 1,11%  0,25  0,022 2,21% 2,48%  150.689.887  $1.715.653  $11.385,32 
16 Eastern Africa  52 1,52%  0,16  0,155 4,70% 0,48%  320.396.000  $334.965  $1.045,47 
17 South Asia  228 6,68%  0,14  0,044 24,61% 7,47%  1.677.377.000  $5.168.519  $3.081,31 
18 Melanesia  1 0,03%  0,12  0,053 0,13% 0,03%  8.524.000  $18.776  $2.202,72 
19 South-East Asia  67 1,96%  0,11  0,024 8,55% 4,08%  582.798.317  $2.824.623  $4.846,66 
20 Central Asia  7 0,21%  0,11  0,023 0,91% 0,44%  61.793.000  $303.758  $4.915,73 
21 East Asia  129 3,78%  0,08  0,009 22,75% 21,16%  1.550.171.845  $14.645.284  $9.447,52 
22 Micronesia  -   0,00%  -    -   0,00% 0,00%  231.000  $1.010  $4.372,29 
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GDP per  
capita  
(calculated)
1 Polynesia  1 0,03%  3,41  0,600 0,00% 0,00%  293.000  $1.667  $5.689,42 
2 West Africa  155 4,54%  0,51  0,314 4,50% 0,71%  306.624.784  $493.947  $1.610,92 
3 Middle Africa  55 1,61%  0,43  0,224 1,89% 0,36%  128.676.106  $246.072  $1.912,34 
4 Eastern Africa  52 1,52%  0,16  0,155 4,70% 0,48%  320.396.000  $334.965  $1.045,47 
5 Caribbean  36 1,05%  0,98  0,134 0,54% 0,39%  36.889.000  $268.328  $7.273,93 
6 North Africa  133 3,90%  0,66  0,124 2,97% 1,55%  202.396.990  $1.072.828  $5.300,61 
7 Western Europe  698 20,45%  3,65  0,105 2,81% 9,61%  191.415.091  $6.653.835  $34.761,29 
8 Northern Europe  303 8,88%  3,06  0,087 1,45% 5,00%  98.876.895  $3.463.086  $35.024,22 
9 North America  884 25,90%  2,57  0,057 5,05% 22,45%  344.363.000  $15.537.339  $45.119,07 
10 Melanesia  1 0,03%  0,12  0,053 0,13% 0,03%  8.524.000  $18.776  $2.202,72 
11 Southern Europe  198 5,80%  1,28  0,050 2,27% 5,77%  154.881.618  $3.991.015  $25.768,16 
12 South Asia  228 6,68%  0,14  0,044 24,61% 7,47%  1.677.377.000  $5.168.519  $3.081,31 
13 Australia / New Zealand  42 1,23%  1,57  0,043 0,39% 1,40%  26.830.605  $966.879  $36.036,42 
14 Western Asia  106 3,11%  0,46  0,039 3,37% 3,88%  229.939.775  $2.688.548  $11.692,40 
15 Southern Africa  15 0,44%  0,26  0,028 0,84% 0,78%  57.467.300  $541.607  $9.424,61 
16 South America  112 3,28%  0,29  0,028 5,73% 5,87%  390.255.488  $4.060.056  $10.403,58 
17 South-East Asia  67 1,96%  0,11  0,024 8,55% 4,08%  582.798.317  $2.824.623  $4.846,66 
18 Central Asia  7 0,21%  0,11  0,023 0,91% 0,44%  61.793.000  $303.758  $4.915,73 
19 Central America  38 1,11%  0,25  0,022 2,21% 2,48%  150.689.887  $1.715.653  $11.385,32 
20 Eastern Europe  85 2,49%  0,29  0,020 4,31% 6,08%  293.997.659  $4.206.194  $14.306,90 
21 East Asia  129 3,78%  0,08  0,009 22,75% 21,16%  1.550.171.845  $14.645.284  $9.447,52 
22 Micronesia  -   0,00%  -    -   0,00% 0,00%  231.000  $1.010  $4.372,29 
Table 2. (III) 
Analysis by Region (UN Geoscheme)
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Table 3. 
Analysis by OECD / G77 class
Table 4. 
Analysis by Continent (UN Geoscheme)
Rank G77 / OECD / - NGOs NGOs 
(UN %)













GDP per  
capita  
(calculated)
1 OECD  2.295 67,24%  1,86  0,058 18,08% 57,52%  1.231.926.233  $39.804.046  $32.310,41 
2 G77  947 27,75%  0,18  0,037 76,95% 36,67%  5.244.221.773  $25.378.286  $4.839,29 
3 Neither OECD nor G77  103 3,02%  0,30  0,026 4,97% 5,81%  338.740.354  $4.021.657  $11.872,39 
1 OECD  2.295 67,24%  1,86  0,058 18,08% 57,52%  1.231.926.233  $39.804.046  $32.310,41 
2 Neither OECD nor G77  103 3,02%  0,30  0,026 4,97% 5,81%  338.740.354  $4.021.657  $11.872,39 
3 G77  947 27,75%  0,18  0,037 76,95% 36,67%  5.244.221.773  $25.378.286  $4.839,29 
1 OECD  2.295 67,24%  1,86  0,058 18,08% 57,52%  1.231.926.233  $39.804.046  $32.310,41 
2 G77  947 27,75%  0,18  0,037 76,95% 36,67%  5.244.221.773  $25.378.286  $4.839,29 
3 Neither OECD nor G77  103 3,02%  0,30  0,026 4,97% 5,81%  338.740.354  $4.021.657  $11.872,39 

















GDP per  
capita  
(calculated)
1 Europe  1.284 37,62%  1,74  0,070 10,85% 26,46%  739.171.263  $18.314.130  $24.776,57 
2 Americas  1.070 31,35%  1,16  0,050 13,53% 31,19%  922.197.375  $21.581.376  $23.402,12 
3 Asia  537 15,73%  0,13  0,021 60,19% 37,04%  4.102.079.937  $25.630.732  $6.248,23 
4 Africa  410 12,01%  0,40  0,152 14,90% 3,89%  1.015.561.180  $2.689.419  $2.648,21 
5 Oceania  44 1,29%  1,23  0,045 0,53% 1,43%  35.878.605  $988.332  $27.546,56 
1 Europe  1.284 37,62%  1,74  0,070 10,85% 26,46%  739.171.263  $18.314.130  $24.776,57 
2 Oceania  44 1,29%  1,23  0,045 0,53% 1,43%  35.878.605  $988.332  $27.546,56 
3 Americas  1.070 31,35%  1,16  0,050 13,53% 31,19%  922.197.375  $21.581.376  $23.402,12 
4 Africa  410 12,01%  0,40  0,152 14,90% 3,89%  1.015.561.180  $2.689.419  $2.648,21 
5 Asia  537 15,73%  0,13  0,021 60,19% 37,04%  4.102.079.937  $25.630.732  $6.248,23 
1 Africa  410 12,01%  0,40  0,152 14,90% 3,89%  1.015.561.180  $2.689.419  $2.648,21 
2 Europe  1.284 37,62%  1,74  0,070 10,85% 26,46%  739.171.263  $18.314.130  $24.776,57 
3 Americas  1.070 31,35%  1,16  0,050 13,53% 31,19%  922.197.375  $21.581.376  $23.402,12 
4 Oceania  44 1,29%  1,23  0,045 0,53% 1,43%  35.878.605  $988.332  $27.546,56 
5 Asia  537 15,73%  0,13  0,021 60,19% 37,04%  4.102.079.937  $25.630.732  $6.248,23 
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Table 5. (I) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Afghanistan South Asia Asia G77
Åland Islands Northern Europe Europe
Albania Southern Europe Europe
Algeria Northern Africa Africa G77
American Samoa Polynesia Oceania
Andorra Southern Europe Europe
Angola Middle Africa Africa G77
Anguilla Caribbean Americas
Antigua and Barbuda Caribbean Americas G77
Argentina South America Americas G77
Armenia Western Asia Asia
Aruba Caribbean Americas
Australia Australia / New Zealand Oceania OECD
Austria Western Europe Europe OECD
Azerbaijan Western Asia Asia
Bahamas Caribbean Americas G77
Bahrain Western Asia Asia G77
Bangladesh South Asia Asia G77
Barbados Caribbean Americas G77
Belarus Eastern Europe Europe
Belgium Western Europe Europe OECD
Belize Central America Americas G77
Benin Western Africa Africa G77
Bermuda North America Americas
Bhutan South Asia Asia G77
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) South America Americas G77
Bosnia and Herzegovina Southern Europe Europe G77
Botswana Southern Africa Africa G77
Brazil South America Americas G77
British Virgin Islands Caribbean Americas
Brunei Darussalam South-East Asia Asia G77
Bulgaria Eastern Europe Europe
Burkina Faso Western Africa Africa G77
Burundi Eastern Africa Africa G77
Cambodia South-East Asia Asia G77
Cameroon Middle Africa Africa G77
Canada North America Americas OECD
Cape Verde Western Africa Africa G77
Cayman Islands Caribbean Americas
From: United Nations Geoscheme,  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm, Retrieved 20 September 2010
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Table 5. (I) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Table 5. (II) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Central African Republic Middle Africa Africa G77
Chad Middle Africa Africa G77
Channel Islands Northern Europe Europe
Chile South America Americas G77
China East Asia Asia G77
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region East Asia Asia
China, Macao Special Administrative Region East Asia Asia
Colombia South America Americas G77
Comoros Eastern Africa Africa G77
Congo Middle Africa Africa G77
Cook Islands Polynesia Oceania
Costa Rica Central America Americas G77
Cote d'Ivoire Western Africa Africa G77
Croatia Southern Europe Europe
Cuba Caribbean Americas G77
Cyprus Western Asia Asia
Czech Republic Eastern Europe Europe OECD
Democratic People's Republic of Korea East Asia Asia G77
Democratic Republic of the Congo Middle Africa Africa G77
Denmark Northern Europe Europe OECD
Djibouti Eastern Africa Africa G77
Dominica Caribbean Americas G77
Dominican Republic Caribbean Americas G77
Ecuador South America Americas G77
Egypt Northern Africa Africa G77
El Salvador Central America Americas G77
Equatorial Guinea Middle Africa Africa G77
Eritrea Eastern Africa Africa G77
Estonia Northern Europe Europe
Ethiopia Eastern Africa Africa G77
Faeroe Islands Northern Europe Europe
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) South America Americas
Fiji Melanesia Oceania G77
Finland Northern Europe Europe OECD
France Western Europe Europe OECD
French Guiana South America Americas
French Polynesia Polynesia Oceania
Gabon Middle Africa Africa G77
Gambia Western Africa Africa G77
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Table 5. (III) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Georgia Western Asia Asia
Germany Western Europe Europe OECD
Ghana Western Africa Africa G77
Gibraltar Southern Europe Europe
Greece Southern Europe Europe OECD
Greenland North America Americas
Grenada Caribbean Americas G77
Guadeloupe Caribbean Americas
Guam Micronesia Oceania
Guatemala Central America Americas G77
Guernsey Northern Europe Europe
Guinea Western Africa Africa G77
Guinea-Bissau Western Africa Africa G77
Guyana South America Americas G77
Haiti Caribbean Americas G77
Holy See Southern Europe Europe
Honduras Central America Americas G77
Hungary Eastern Europe Europe OECD
Iceland Northern Europe Europe OECD
India South Asia Asia G77
Indonesia South-East Asia Asia G77
Iran (Islamic Republic of) South Asia Asia G77
Iraq Western Asia Asia G77
Ireland Northern Europe Europe OECD
Isle of Man Northern Europe Europe
Israel Western Asia Asia
Italy Southern Europe Europe OECD
Jamaica Caribbean Americas G77
Japan East Asia Asia OECD
Jersey Northern Europe Europe
Jordan Western Asia Asia G77
Kazakhstan Central Asia Asia
Kenya Eastern Africa Africa G77
Kiribati Micronesia Oceania
Kuwait Western Asia Asia G77
Kyrgyzstan Central Asia Asia
Lao People's Democratic Republic South-East Asia Asia G77
Latvia Northern Europe Europe
Lebanon Western Asia Asia G77
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Table 5. (IV) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Lesotho Southern Africa Africa G77
Liberia Western Africa Africa G77
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Northern Africa Africa G77
Liechtenstein Western Europe Europe
Lithuania Northern Europe Europe
Luxembourg Western Europe Europe OECD
Madagascar Eastern Africa Africa G77
Malawi Eastern Africa Africa G77
Malaysia South-East Asia Asia G77
Maldives South Asia Asia G77
Mali Western Africa Africa G77
Malta Southern Europe Europe
Marshall Islands Micronesia Oceania G77
Martinique Caribbean Americas
Mauritania Western Africa Africa G77
Mauritius Eastern Africa Africa G77
Mayotte Eastern Africa Africa
Mexico Central America Americas OECD
Micronesia (Federated States of) Micronesia Oceania G77
Monaco Western Europe Europe
Mongolia East Asia Asia G77
Montenegro Southern Europe Europe
Montserrat Caribbean Americas
Morocco Northern Africa Africa G77
Mozambique Eastern Africa Africa G77
Myanmar South-East Asia Asia G77
Namibia Southern Africa Africa G77
Nauru Micronesia Oceania
Nepal South Asia Asia G77
Netherlands Western Europe Europe OECD
Netherlands Antilles Caribbean Americas
New Caledonia Melanesia Oceania
New Zealand Australia / New Zealand Oceania OECD
Nicaragua Central America Americas G77
Niger Western Africa Africa G77
Nigeria Western Africa Africa G77
Niue Polynesia Oceania
Norfolk Island Australia / New Zealand Oceania
Northern Mariana Islands Micronesia Oceania
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Table 5. (V) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Norway Northern Europe Europe OECD
Occupied Palestinian Territory Western Asia Asia G77
Oman Western Asia Asia G77
Pakistan South Asia Asia G77
Palau Micronesia Oceania G77
Panama Central America Americas G77
Papua New Guinea Melanesia Oceania G77
Paraguay South America Americas G77
Peru South America Americas G77
Philippines South-East Asia Asia G77
Pitcairn Polynesia Oceania
Poland Eastern Europe Europe OECD
Portugal Southern Europe Europe OECD
Puerto Rico Caribbean Americas
Qatar Western Asia Asia G77
Republic of Korea East Asia Asia OECD
Republic of Moldova Eastern Europe Europe
Réunion Eastern Africa Africa
Romania Eastern Europe Europe
Russian Federation Eastern Europe Europe
Rwanda Eastern Africa Africa G77
Saint Helena Western Africa Africa
Saint Kitts and Nevis Caribbean Americas G77
Saint Lucia Caribbean Americas G77
Saint Martin (French part) Caribbean Americas
Saint Pierre and Miquelon North America Americas
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Caribbean Americas G77
Saint-Barthélemy Caribbean Americas
Samoa Polynesia Oceania G77
San Marino Southern Europe Europe
Sao Tome and Principe Middle Africa Africa G77
Saudi Arabia Western Asia Asia G77
Senegal Western Africa Africa G77
Serbia Southern Europe Europe
Seychelles Eastern Africa Africa G77
Sierra Leone Western Africa Africa G77
Singapore South-East Asia Asia G77
Slovakia Eastern Europe Europe OECD
Slovenia Southern Europe Europe OECD
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Table 5. (VI) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Solomon Islands Melanesia Oceania G77
Somalia Eastern Africa Africa G77
South Africa Southern Africa Africa G77
Spain Southern Europe Europe OECD
Sri Lanka South Asia Asia G77
Sudan Northern Africa Africa G77
Suriname South America Americas G77
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands Northern Europe Europe
Swaziland Southern Africa Africa G77
Sweden Northern Europe Europe OECD
Switzerland Western Europe Europe OECD
Syrian Arab Republic Western Asia Asia G77
Tajikistan Central Asia Asia
Thailand South-East Asia Asia G77
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Southern Europe Europe
Timor-Leste South-East Asia Asia G77
Togo Western Africa Africa G77
Tokelau Polynesia Oceania
Tonga Polynesia Oceania G77
Trinidad and Tobago Caribbean Americas G77
Tunisia Northern Africa Africa G77
Turkey Western Asia Asia OECD
Turkmenistan Central Asia Asia G77
Turks and Caicos Islands Caribbean Americas
Tuvalu Polynesia Oceania
Uganda Eastern Africa Africa G77
Ukraine Eastern Europe Europe
United Arab Emirates Western Asia Asia G77
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Northern Europe Europe OECD
United Republic of Tanzania Eastern Africa Africa G77
United States of America North America Americas OECD
United States Virgin Islands Caribbean Americas
Uruguay South America Americas G77
Uzbekistan Central Asia Asia
Vanuatu Melanesia Oceania G77
Venezuela South America Americas G77
Viet Nam South-East Asia Asia G77
Wallis and Futuna Island Polynesia Oceania
Western Sahara Northern Africa Africa
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Table 5. (VII) 
Countries / Territories with UN Geoscheme-assigned region, continent and OECD / G77 class
Country / Territory UN-defined region UN-defined continent OECD / G77 / -
Yemen Western Asia Asia G77
Zambia Eastern Africa Africa G77
Zimbabwe Eastern Africa Africa G77
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